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BUCKLEY V. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOUNDATION: 
CAN THE STATE PRESERVE DIRECT DEMOCRACY FOR THE 
CITIZEN, OR WILL IT BE CONSUMED BY THE SPECIAL 
INTEREST GROUP? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The ability of the citizen to directly initiate law within his or her own state 
is a right that has been fought for and achieved by the people.  Direct 
democracy places the power to initiate law into the hands of the citizen through 
the ballot box.  In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation 
[ACLF],1 the United States Supreme Court invalidated Colorado’s attempt to 
place controls, designed to prevent fraud and ensure efficiency on the state’s 
direct democracy system, because the controls directly hindered the freedom of 
political speech.  The challenged regulations were found to unconstitutionally 
burden core political speech, without narrowly promoting a compelling state 
interest.  The Court’s opinion, emphasizing freedom of political speech over 
the state’s legitimate interest of protection, however, could serve to undercut 
the objective of direct democracy: to provide the citizen with greater control in 
the political system.  The Court has furthered the ability of special interest 
groups to consume the process by using their large pocketbooks to promote 
legislation advantageous to their private concerns, effectively shutting out 
smaller grassroots concerns.  Seeking to prevent fraud and corruption by big-
money out-of-state special interest groups, Colorado failed in its attempt to 
restrict the process to allow better information to be provided to voters when 
such groups are sponsoring referendums. 
This paper will examine the policy behind direct democracy, its influence 
in state government, and how the decision in Buckley v. ACLF has affected the 
ability of states to place controls on the process.  The author’s view is that 
although the exact level of scrutiny to apply after the Court’s decision is 
uncertain, it can provide a state some guidance to regulate the initiative 
process.  To prevent special interest groups from overwhelming the direct 
democracy system, states have found it necessary to place controls to keep the 
system open for the grass roots initiatives for which the system was originally 
envisioned.  The states, however, may not impede political speech in 
attempting to preserve the grass roots objectives of direct democracy.  Section 
 
 1. 119 S. Ct. 636 (1999). 
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II provides a background to the theories underlying direct democracy, how it 
has developed through our nation’s history, and the response by state 
legislatures.  Section III contains the procedural posture for Buckley v. ACLF.  
In this section, the author will examine through the arguments of the majority, 
concurring, and dissenting opinions the three Colorado provisions struck down 
by the Court, namely the registered voter restriction, the identification badge 
restriction, and the financial disclosure provisions.  Section IV contains the 
author’s analysis of the Court’s varying opinions on the proper level of 
scrutiny to the registered voter and financial disclosure requirements.  Since 
the identification badge requirement was unanimously found by the Court to be 
unconstitutional,2 it will be discussed briefly.  This section also analyzes the 
balance between the state’s ability to safeguard the direct democracy process, 
without interfering with the freedom of political speech, as well as the possible 
implications that this ruling may have on the state and the citizen.  Section V 
will conclude the author’s view.  The constitutionality of certain propositions 
sought through direct democracy means will not be discussed in this paper.  
Many questions arise toward the variety of discriminatory laws that find their 
way to implementation through the ballot box,3 however that issue is beyond 
the scope of analyzing the direct democracy process itself.  Nor will this paper 
discuss the corrupt use of campaign contributions and lobbying by special 
interest groups within the legislature to promote beneficial legislation,4 other 
than how it has contributed to the necessity of alternative methods 
In order to ensure a reliable and efficient system, states have found it 
necessary to place controls on the process.  Restrictions on direct democracy 
are a necessary protection to ensure voters are well informed of not only the 
issue in the initiative, but the sources behind it.  Core political speech is a 
fundamental right protected by the First Amendment, however it is not 
absolute.  If the objectives of direct democracy are to be obtained, the process 
itself must be safeguarded to ensure the citizen, and not just the group with the 
largest pocketbook, has the power to initiate law.  Although the Court in 
Buckley v. ACLF struck down the state imposed restrictions, it serves as a 
 
 2. See id. at 646, 651 (Thomas, J., concurring), 654 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part), 662 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 3. One problem that has arisen with initiatives is the occasional use of the system to 
“restrict the services provided or rights accorded to a relatively unpopular group.”  CITIZENS AS 
LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 229 (Shaun Bowler, et. al., eds., 
1998).  For instance, the State of Nebraska voted by an overwhelming majority of 70% in support 
of initiative 416, recognizing marriage as only between a man and a woman.  Stephen Buttry & 
Leslei Reed, Same Sex Marriage Ban Passes Overwhelmingly, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Nov. 8, 
2000, at A1. 
 4. See Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, How the Little Guy Gets Crunched, TIME, Feb. 
7, 2000, at 38 (discussing how powerful interests pour in millions of dollars in campaign 
contributions to get laws passed advantageous to them and hurtful for those who are not able to 
contribute similar amounts of money). 
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guide to allow the state the ability to safeguard the direct democracy process, 
while ensuring its citizens the freedom to political speech. 
II. DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
Direct democracy provides the “opportunity for groups and individuals to 
draft legislation directly, to overturn laws adopted by legislatures, and to recall 
defective representatives.”5  It allows for citizens who are not part of the 
legislative process to draft their own laws through grassroots efforts.6  
However, changes in the contemporary era might have removed the “citizen” 
from the grassroots.7  Throughout the development of democratic forms of 
government, direct democracy have existed to allow the people to have a 
direct, although minimal, voice in the government.8  Even prior to democratic 
rule, many ancient societies recognized the right of ordinary citizens to petition 
the government, including the right to suggest specific changes in legislation.9  
The early uses of direct democracy, however, differ from today.10  Modern 
forms of direct democracy available in the United States include the initiative, 
referendum, and the recall.11  The initiative provides the people the right to 
introduce legislation through popular vote by allowing the citizens, through the 
collection of voter signatures, to propose legislation and make it law through a 
vote of the electorate.12  The initiative is found in two forms throughout the 
United States.  A direct initiative can be either a constitutional amendment or a 
statute that is proposed through a petition and then submitted directly to the 
voters for approval or rejection, without any action by the legislature.13  Once 
the initiative has been voted and approved by the electorate, the initiative has 
the force and effect of a constitutional amendment or statute.  In comparison, 
the indirect initiative allows statutes to be proposed by a petition that is first 
submitted to the state legislature who then debates and votes on the petition in 
 
 5. CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS, supra note 3, at 2. 
 6. Id. at 3. 
 7. Id. at 19. 
 8. “Ancient Athens, Saxon tribes, Thirteenth Century Swiss cantons, and numerous other 
peoples from earlier times all regularly made governmental decisions through some form of face-
to-face meeting.”  DAVID MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 31-33 (1984). 
 9. PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVES: ISSUES, OPTIONS, 
AND COMPARISONS 7 (1998). 
 10. Id. 
 11. The referendum is a procedure allowing citizens to force a public vote on statues adopted 
by the legislature, while the recall allows citizens to force a vote, through the collection of 
signatures, as to whether a particular, named elected official shall continue in office.  DUBOIS & 
FEENEY, supra note 9, at 7-8. 
 12. Id. 
 13. MAGLEBY, supra note 8, at 35. 
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a regular session.14  However, if the statute has not been approved by the 
legislature after a specified time, or if the legislature has amended the original 
initiative in a way unacceptable to the original proponents, the proponents may 
then gather the remaining required signatures and submit the original initiative 
to the voters as a direct initiative.15  Some states provide that if the legislature 
does not approve the indirectly initiated proposal, it may offer a substitute 
proposal on the same subject to accompany the original one on the next general 
election ballot. 
The use of direct democracy in the United States has been a subject of 
debate since the establishment of the representative form of government.16  
Numerous arguments against giving direct power to the population have been 
made since the founding of this country.17  The authors of the Constitution 
preferred a system of representative government, rather than leaving control of 
the country in the hands of the population.18  They believed the most important 
political questions were too complicated to be decided by popular vote.19  The 
system was designed to allow elected representatives, who would have time to 
study and understand the laws, to debate the merits of the legislation.20  James 
Madison feared that “factions” would be controlled by “popular passions” and 
would force their majority beliefs and ideas over the minority.21  A continuing 
concern that has accompanied the use of direct democracy is the fear that 
“direct democracy would produce policies hostile to the interests of unpopular 
 
 14. Id. at 35-6. 
 15. Id. 
 16. CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS, supra note 3, at 1. 
 17. Professor Magleby has provided a list of the arguments against direct legislation, 
including: the true beneficiaries of direct legislation will not be the people but the special 
interests; direct legislation will result in an unreasonably complex ballot and “frivolous” 
legislation; voters are ill-equipped to understand complicated proposals and unprepared to grapple 
with the confusing campaigns and appeals that are a part of the initiative process; the legislative 
process is a much better way to make public policy; direct legislation will not educate the voters, 
nor will it increase interest in government; direct legislation will endanger democracy and 
undermine representative government.  MAGLEBY, supra note 8, at 29-30. 
 18. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 9, at 2. 
 19. Philip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative Government, Direct 
Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 421, 424 
(1998). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.  According to James Madison, a “faction” consists of “a number of citizens, whether 
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and activated by some common 
impulse of passion, or of intent adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community.”  Id. at 424 (citing THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 10, at 78 
(James Madison) (Clinton Rosier ed., 1961), available at http://www.mcs.net/~knautzr/ 
fed/fed10.htm). 
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minorities.”22  Madison also believed the control of such a large country could 
not be left to the population as a whole, but rather decisions should be made by 
a “relatively small number of people representing the larger population.”23  
Madison wrote that representative government “refine[s] and enlarge[s] public 
views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, 
whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of our country, and whose 
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or 
partial considerations.”24  The founding fathers believed that societal problems 
were too complicated to be resolved by the public through the use of the 
initiative, and were better left to the legislature to be developed in a well-
reasoned analysis.25  Those who opposed the use of direct democracy in the 
United States successfully prevented its use for the first one hundred years of 
this nation. 
Starting in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a movement 
arose to give greater control to the people.  The Populists26 and later the 
Progressives27 fashioned and promoted the initiative, referendum, and the 
recall.28  They believed that legislatures and political party machines in the 
period of economic prosperity had become too dependent on special interests 
to allow the true needs of the country to be promoted.29  Their objective was 
not to abolish the representative form of government, but to advance a greater 
popular participation to bring an end to the corruption.30  Early twentieth 
century reformers hoped that by gaining more direct access to the legislative 
process, citizens would be able to control public affairs and thereby “insure 
responsive as well as responsible government.”31  The Progressive movement 
 
 22. CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS, supra note 3, at 11.  See supra note 3 and accompanying 
text. 
 23. Frickey, supra note 19, at 424 (citing THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 10, supra note 21, 
at 83). 
 24. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 10, supra note 21, at 82. 
 25. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 9, at 16. 
 26. The Populists consisted of midwestern farmers and were most aggressive in the late 
Nineteenth Century.  DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS, THE BALLOT INITIATIVE 
REVOLUTION 7 (1989). 
 27. The Progressives were pro-labor Democrats that adopted most of the Populists’ reform 
agenda including home rule, nonpartisan elections, the commission plan for local government, 
merit systems, direct election of United States senators, women’s suffrage, and independent 
regulatory commissions as well as the forms of direct democracy, as their own, drawing their 
strength and leadership from young, prosperous members of the urban middle class who saw the 
corruption of the cities and wanted to expose the social problems and government and corporate 
wrongdoing.  Id. at 9 (citing RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 131, 167 (1956)). 
 28. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 9, at 7-8 and accompanying text. 
 29. Id. at 17. 
 30. Id. 
 31. CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS, supra note 3, at 1 (citing FREDERIC C. HOWE, THE CITY: 
THE HOPE FOR DEMOCRACY (1967)). 
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advanced the ballot initiative as a means of limiting the control of wealthy 
special interests and restoring electoral power to the voters.32  Direct 
democracy benefits society by including opportunities for citizens to 
participate directly in making laws under which they live, creating a well-
functioning democracy, increasing the interest and participation in 
government, reducing citizen alienation, and serving as an antidote for 
declining voter turnout in elections.33 
Throughout the twentieth century, many of the states implemented a direct 
democracy process.34  It has been used for a variety of issues of which the 
citizens believed the legislatures were either unresponsive or unwilling to 
initiate.  For instance, “in 1992 citizens from twelve states adopted term limits 
for their state legislatures through the initiative process and voted on such 
matters as health care, the right to die, welfare reform, tax reduction, and 
government structure.”35  It is recognized that direct democracy basically 
serves one purpose: “to provide another lawmaking outlet for organized 
interests that fail to get what they want from the legislature.”36  The explosion 
in the use of direct democracy by special interest groups over the past two 
decades has transformed the process into a big-dollar industry.37  In 1990, the 
average total expenditure for each ballot measure in Oregon climbed to more 
than $900,000.38  In recent years, the initiative and referendum process has 
come to be more and more influenced by out-of-state interests, which employ 
professional nationwide firms whom have transformed the grassroots initiative 
into a big money industry.39  Professor David Magleby has closely examined 
 
 32. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. 636, 659 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  See also H. CROLY, 
PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 236-37, 248-49, 254-55 (Transaction ed., 1998); H. STEELE 
COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND 338 (1950); Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of 
Direct Democracy, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 23 (1997). 
 33. MAGLEBEY, supra note 8, at 45-51. 
 34. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 9, at 28 tbl.1.  Today, 24 states and the District of 
Colombia have adopted some form of direct democracy.  Id.  States that have enacted the direct 
initiative are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, 
Illinois, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota.  
States that have enacted the indirect initiative include: Alaska, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, and Wyoming.  Both Utah and Washington allow for both direct and indirect 
initiatives.  Id. 
 35. Id. at 1. 
 36. Frickey, supra note 19, at 432. 
 37. Id. (citing Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 
385 n.15 (1984)). 
 38. See CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN OREGON 13 
(1996) (providing the number of initiatives in 1994); Nena Baker, Need a Hand with Your 
Ballot?, THE OREGONIAN (Portland, OR), Oct. 27, 1996, at A1 (providing the number of 
initiatives for 1996). 
 39. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 659 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (1999); See, e.g., 
Lowenstein & Stern, The First Amendment and Paid Initiative Petition Circulators, 17 HASTINGS 
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and provided explicit data on the use of direct democracy by different groups 
today.40  He notes that direct democracy has valued public “participation, open 
access, and political equality,” however, competition between the professional 
firms to expand the base of their participants have prevented compromise and 
continuity.41  Initiative agendas are generally set by the “capacity to hire 
professional signature-gathering firms or by the dedication of issue activists or 
single-issue groups” rather than by “issues of prominent concern to the general 
population.”42  Unfortunately, the objectives of increased voter turnout and 
reduction of alienation of the people have not occurred.43  It has been 
recognized that overall, “direct legislation is prone to serious biases insofar as 
participation and representation are concerned.”44  Serious concerns continue 
to exist as to whether the objectives of direct democracy have been met in view 
of the role special interest groups have played.45 
State reactions to the use of the initiative process by special-interest groups 
have been to impose restrictions to prevent abuse.  When states regulate the 
ballot process, questions arise in balancing the heightened protection for 
political speech under the First Amendment against state interests of ensuring a 
fair and orderly democratic process.  The Supreme Court generally applies a 
strict scrutiny standard when a fundamental right is involved under the First 
Amendment,46 applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.47  
The proper level of scrutiny will be examined in the next section.  States have 
considerable leeway to protect the integrity and reliability of the ballot 
initiative process similar to the general election process.48  The First 
Amendment requires the courts to be vigilant in guarding against undue 
hindrances to political conservation and the exchange of ideas.49  Unless the 
 
CONST. L.Q. 175, 176 (1989); Broader, Ballot Battle, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1998, at A1, A6; 
Slind-Flor, Election Result: Litigation over Propositions, NATIONAL L. J., Nov. 16, 1998, at A1, 
A8. 
 40. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 9, at 18.  See MAGLEBY, supra note 8, at 181. 
 41. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 9, at 18. 
 42. Id. at 19. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
 47. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 649 (Thomas, J., concurring).  The First Amendment 
protections of speech, press, and religion have been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.  
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 n.5 (1968) (citing Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). 
 48. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 637. 
 49. Id.  See also Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421 (1988). 
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state can justify regulations that limit free speech by demonstrating a 
compelling state interest, the court will strike the regulation down. 
III. BUCKLEY V. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOUNDATION 
The Supreme Court found that Colorado, in its attempt to place controls on 
the abuse of the direct democracy system by large special interest groups, had 
violated First Amendment protections of political speech.  The Court’s multi-
opinioned decision demonstrates the difficulty in creating regulations on the 
initiative process without imposing undue burdens on the fundamental right to 
political speech.  The four opinions apply a flexible standard of review, 
however, the standard differs in each analysis.  As a result, the opinions 
disagree as to the constitutionality of the registered voter requirement and the 
financial disclosure provision.  The identification badge requirement was 
unanimously found to be an unreasonable restriction on the petitioner’s right to 
anonymity by requiring petitioners to wear a badge identifying their name and 
if they were paid or a volunteer. 
A. Direct Democracy in Colorado 
Colorado is one of several states to allow its citizens to make law directly 
through initiatives placed on election ballots through the direct initiative.50  
The process is designed to give citizens more control over the initiation of laws 
that they believe the State Legislature has failed to enact.  However, the direct 
approach, as opposed to the indirect, does not allow for the legislature to 
examine the proposition.  Contrary to the grass-roots purpose of direct 
democracy, it has been used as a tool by special interest groups to enact 
legislation and bypass the state legislature altogether.  In an attempt to curtail 
this use by special interest groups, the state of Colorado had attempted to 
restrict direct democracy prior to Buckley v. ACFL to allow voters the 
opportunity to be fully informed of their decisions.  In its 1988 decision of 
Meyer v. Grant, the Supreme Court invalidated a Colorado law that prohibited 
payment to circulators of ballot-initiative petitions.51  The Court held petition 
circulation to be “core political speech,” which is protected by the First 
Amendment because it involves “interactive communication concerning 
 
 50. See COLO. CONST. art. V, §§1(1), (2); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-40-101 – 133 (1998).  The 
initiative has become an important feature of Colorado government since it was adopted by the 
state in 1910.  DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 9, at 28 tbl. 1.  From its adoption until 1996, 
Colorado voters have had 153 initiatives on the ballot.  Id. at 32 tbl. 5.  Colorado has the fourth 
greatest use of the ballot initiative, and has a 39% adoption rate.  Id.  As of 1996, the top three 
states with the greatest number of initiatives placed on the ballot are Oregon with 292 and a 34% 
rate, California with 257 and a 33% rate, and North Dakota with 170 and a 45% rate.  Id.  The 
initiative process in Colorado has been used forty-four times for statutes and 109 times to amend 
the constitution from its adoption through 1996.  DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 9, at 30 tbl. 3. 
 51. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988). 
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political change.”52  However, the Court also recognized that “there must be a 
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some 
sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process.”53  In 
recognizing the need for state regulation, the Court invalidated the prohibition 
of paid circulators because it drastically reduced the number of petitioners 
available, and made it less likely to acquire the number of signatures necessary 
to place the issue on the ballot.54 
B. Procedural Posture of Buckley v. ACLF 
The complaint in Buckley v. ACLF was originally filed in 1993, in 
response to six state-imposed controls on the Colorado initiative-petition 
process,55 passed by the Colorado State Legislature following Meyer.  
American Constitutional Law Foundation56 and individual Colorado residents57 
filed for declaratory and injunctive relief from restrictions on the circulation 
and submission of petitions to propose state laws and constitutional 
amendments.  The United States District Court for the District of Colorado 
validated some restrictions of the Colorado statute and invalidated others as a 
violation of political speech.58 
 
 52. Id. at 422. 
 53. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 788 (1974); See also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New 
Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) (upholding Minnesota’s electoral regulations which prohibit an 
individual from appearing on the ballot as the candidate of more than one political party). 
 54. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422-23. 
 55. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 640. 
 56. The American Constitutional Law Foundation is a volunteer public interest, membership 
organization with nearly 300,000 members, dedicated to the principles of constitutional self-
government, as incorporated in the First Amendment’s right of the people to peaceably petition 
the government for redress of grievances.  Its membership consisted primarily of individual 
proponents, organizers, and circulators involved mostly in volunteer petitioning efforts.  Mr. Bill 
Orr is its unpaid Executive Director and Founder.  See Respondent’s Brief, Buckley v. ACLF (No. 
97-930), available in 1998 WL 328326. 
 57. Individual plaintiffs included: David Aitken, who, as chairman of the Colorado 
Libertarian Party, had organized the circulation of several initiative petitions; Jon Baraga, 
statewide petition coordinator for the Colorado Hemp Initiative; Craig Eley and Jack Hawkins, 
circulators of petitions for the Safe Workplace Initiative and Worker’s Choice of Care Initiative; 
Lonnie Haynes, an initiative-supporting member of ACLF; Alden Kautz, a circulator of numerous 
initiative petitions; Bill Orr, executive director of ACLF and a qualified but unregistered voter, 
who regularly participated in the petition process and wanted to circulate petitions; and William 
David Orr, a minor who wanted to circulate petitions.  See ACLF, Inc. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092, 
1096-1097 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Brief for Respondents David Aitken et al. at 2,3,5,6, Buckley 
v. ACLF (No. 97-930). 
 58. ACLF v. Meyer, 870 F.Supp. 995 (D.Colo. 1994).  Among the restrictions the district 
court found sufficient were the requirements that circulators be registered voters eligible to vote 
on measures subject to petition, petitions be circulated within a six-month period, and the state 
had a compelling need for names and addresses of circulators in affidavits attesting to validity of 
signatures.  Id.  However, the district court found the provisions requiring circulators to wear 
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The parties cross-appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and 
reversed in part.59  The Tenth Circuit upheld some of the state’s regulations,60 
but held that the Colorado statute requiring initiative and referendum petition 
circulators to be registered electors, the provision requiring circulators for 
initiative and referendum petitions to wear personal identification badges, and 
certain provisions requiring disclosure of information regarding paid 
circulators of initiative and referendum petitions violated free expression under 
the First Amendment.61 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.62  Justice Ginsburg held that the 
Tenth Circuit correctly separated necessary or proper ballot access controls 
from the restrictions the Court believed unjustifiably inhibited the guarantee of 
freedom of speech in the circulation of ballot-initiative petitions.63  The 
Supreme Court reviewed the three controls invalidated by the Circuit Court.64  
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, and filed an opinion.  Justice 
O’Connor concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, filing a 
separate opinion joined by Justice Breyer.  Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, 
also filing a separate opinion. 
C. Level of Scrutiny 
In striking down the prohibition on paid circulators, the Court in Meyer v. 
Grant65 held petition circulation was “core political speech” that involved 
“interactive communication concerning political change,” protected by the 
First Amendment.66  However, the state may provide a “substantial regulation” 
to ensure the process is orderly, fair, and honest.67  The majority applies 
“exacting scrutiny” when the restrictions in question significantly inhibit 
communication with voters about proposed political change, and are not 
 
identification badges, and the disclosure of monthly reports on paid circulators to be a burden on 
political liberty, and an invalid restriction on core political speech.  ACLF v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 
1092 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 59. ACLF v. Meyer, 120 F.3d at 1092. 
 60. Id.  The restrictions upheld by the Circuit Court as reasonable regulations of the ballot-
initiative process were: the requirement that petition circulators be at least 18 years old, COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 1-40-112(1); the limitation of the petition circulation period to six months, § 1-40-
108; and the requirement that circulators attach to each petition section an affidavit containing, 
inter alia, the circulator’s name and address, § 1-40-111(2).  Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 637. 
 61. ACLF v. Meyer, 120 F.3d at 1092. 
 62. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 636. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 639. 
 65. 486 U.S. 414 (1988). 
 66. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 639. 
 67. Id. at 640.  See Storer, 415 U.S. at 730; Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358; Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983). 
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warranted by the state interests alleged to justify those restrictions.68  Petition 
circulation has a political speech component,69 for which First Amendment 
protection for such interaction is “at its zenith.”70  Regulations directly 
burdening the one-on-one, communicative aspect of petition circulation are 
subject to strict scrutiny.71  Restrictions on direct democracy can only be 
upheld if the government can meet a two-prong test.72  A state must first 
demonstrate it has a sufficiently important interest, and secondly, that the 
means to protect that interest have been “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary 
abridgement of associational freedoms.”73  The Court has stated that “no 
litmus-paper test” will separate valid ballot-access provisions from invalid 
interactive speech restrictions.74  However, the Court notes that restrictions in 
the election process itself would require less exacting scrutiny.75  The majority, 
in affirming the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Buckley v. ACLF, found all three 
controls at issue to be excessively restrictive of political speech and therefore 
invalid.76 
Justice Thomas notes, however, that regulations of elections often will 
directly restrict or otherwise burden core political speech and associational 
rights.77  The framework for assessing the constitutionality, under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, of state election laws has been recently established.78  
When a state’s rule imposes severe burdens on speech or association, it must 
be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.  Lesser burdens imposed by 
the state will trigger less exacting review, in which a state’s important 
regulatory interests will typically justify reasonable restrictions.79  When core 
 
 68. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 642. 
 69. Id. at 653 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 70. Id. (citing Meyer, 486 U.S. at 425) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 71. Id. (citing Meyer, 486 U.S. at 420). 
 72. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (“Even a ‘significant interference’ with protected rights 
of political association may be sustained if the state demonstrates a sufficiently important interest 
and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.”) 
(quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488 (1975)); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 
(1968) (recognizing that “even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, 
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when 
the end can be more narrowly achieved”); Shelton v. Thaker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1968). 
 73. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 653. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 646 (citing McIntyre v. Brown, 514 U.S. 334, 353 (1995) (recognizing a state’s 
enforcement interest might justify a more limited identification requirement) (holding that the 
Ohio statute was not simply an election code provision subject to the lesser scrutiny balancing 
test set forth in Burdick). 
 76. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 640. 
 77. Id. at 649 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. (citing Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358-59; Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992); 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 788-90). 
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political speech is at issue, the Court has ordinarily applied strict scrutiny 
without first determining that the statute severely burdens speech.80  When a 
state’s election law directly regulates core political speech, the Court has 
always subjected the challenged restriction to strict scrutiny, and required that 
the legislation be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.81  However, 
Justice Thomas also notes that when a state law indirectly regulates core 
political speech, the Court has also applied strict scrutiny.82  In McIntyre, the 
Court suggested that the sever/lesser burden framework is only resorted to if a 
challenged election law regulates “the mechanics of the electoral process,” and 
not speech.83  Cases that involve an election law that burdens voting and 
associational interests are more difficult to predict.84 
In contrast to Thomas’s view, Justice O’Connor finds a broader range of 
restrictions to be subject to the lesser strict scrutiny standard.  In order to allow 
 
 80. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 650 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 81. Id.  See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (Tennessee law prohibiting 
solicitation of voters and distribution of campaign literature within 100 feet of the entrance of a 
polling place); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 768 (1978) (Massachusetts 
law prohibiting certain business entities from making expenditures for the purpose of affecting 
referendum votes). 
 82. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 649-50.  Justice Thomas notes that in Meyer, the Court 
applied strict scrutiny because they determined that initiative petition circulation “of necessity 
involves both the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion of the merits of the 
proposed change.”  See also Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421. 
 83. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 650 (citing McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345). 
 84. Id.  For example, the Court has subjected Connecticut’s requirement that voters in any 
party primary be registered members of that party to strict scrutiny because it burdened the 
“associational rights of the Party and its members.”  Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 
U.S. 208, 217 (1986).  The Court similarly treated California’s laws limiting the term of office of 
a party chair, and requiring that the chair rotate between residents of northern and southern 
California because they “burden[ed] the associational rights of political parties and their 
members.”  EU v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm’n, 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989).  
Although a state indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election 
process, the Court invalidated the law under strict scrutiny.  Id.  The Court applied strict scrutiny 
to California’s law denying a ballot position to independent candidates who had a registered 
affiliation with a qualified political party within a year of the preceding primary election, 
apparently because it “substantially” burdened the rights to vote and associate.  Storer, 415 U.S. 
at 729.  In Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992), the Court determined that Illinois’ regulation of 
the use of party names and its law establishing signature requirements for nominating petitions 
severely burdened association by limiting new parties’ access to the ballot, and held both 
challenged laws, as construed by the State Supreme Court, unconstitutional because they were not 
narrowly tailored.  Id. at 288-90, 294. 
  By contrast, the Court determined that Minnesota’s law preventing a candidate from 
appearing on the ballot as the choice of more than one party burdened a party’s access to the 
ballot and its associational rights, but not severely, and upheld the ban under lesser scrutiny.  
Timmons, 520 U.S. at 363.  The Court likewise upheld Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting, 
which imposed, at most, a “very limited” burden on voters’ freedom of choice and association.  
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 437. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] BUCKLEY V. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOUNDATION 189 
for regulations that ensure elections are fair and honest, the Court has 
developed a flexible standard to review regulations of the electoral process.85  
She states the proper inquiry is whether the state’s regulations directly and 
substantially burden the one-on-one, communicative aspect of petition 
circulation, or whether they primarily target the electoral process, imposing 
only indirect and less substantial burdens on communication.86  The indirect 
burdens should only be subject to a review for reasonableness.87  Each 
opinion’s view on the correct level of scrutiny determines the validity of the 
restriction in question. 
D. Registered Voter Restriction88 
The Colorado statute requiring initiative and referendum petition 
circulators to be registered electors was found to unconstitutionally infringe on 
free expression.89  By constitutional amendment,90 and corresponding statutory 
change the next year,91 Colorado added to the requirement that petition 
circulators not only be residents, but also registered voters.92  The State offered 
as justification that registration demonstrates “commit[tment] to the Colorado 
law making process” and facilitates verification of the circulator’s residence.93  
The number of unregistered, but voter-eligible residents in Colorado at the 
time of the trial was close to 620,000.94  The proportion of voter eligible, but 
unregistered residents to registered residents, is not extraordinary in 
comparison to other States.  Because the registration requirement drastically 
 
 85. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 654 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (holding Hawaii’s 
prohibition on write-in voting imposed only a limited burden upon the constitutional rights of 
voters). 
 86. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 654 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 87. Id. 
 88. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-112(1) (1998) (“No section of a petition for any initiative or 
referendum measure shall be circulated by any person who is not a registered elector and at least 
eighteen years of age at the time the section is circulated.”). 
 89. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 640. 
 90. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(6) (1980). 
 91. See 1981 Colo. Sess. Laws, Ch.56, § 4. 
 92. The Colorado law similarly provides that only registered voters may circulate petitions 
to place candidates on the ballot, which was not challenged by the ACLF.  Buckley v. ACLF, 119 
S. Ct. 642 n.13.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-905(1) (1998) (“eligible elector” defined as 
“registered elector”). 
 93. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 643 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument, 10,14 (Attorney 
General for Colorado)). 
 94. Id.  See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United 
States 289 tbl.403 (1997). 
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reduces the number of persons available to circulate petitions, the majority 
inquires whether the state’s concerns warrant the reduction.95 
In examining the registered voter requirement, the majority opinion written 
by Justice Ginsburg conducted a balancing test between the state interest, and 
the reduction in the number of persons available to circulate petitions.96  The 
Court noted the requirement that the circulators be voter-eligible, as well as 
registered voters, decreases the pool of potential circulators similar to the ban 
on paid circulators in Meyer.97  Justice Ginsburg notes the dicta in Meyer that 
the challenged restriction reduces the chances that initiative proponents would 
gather signatures sufficient in number to qualify for the ballot, thus limiting the 
proposal’s “ability to make the matter the focus of statewide discussion.”98  
This creates an undue imposition on political expression that the state failed to 
justify.99  Ginsburg does not accept the state’s argument that registration to 
vote is very easy because it does not lift the burden on speech at the time the 
petition is circulated, 100 and some eligible voters choose not to register in order 
to express their political opinion.101 
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, agrees with the majority that the 
restriction is properly invalidated under Meyer because initiative petition 
circulation is core political speech, and thus subject to strict scrutiny.102  The 
aim of a petition is to secure political change, and the First Amendment guards 
against the state’s efforts to restrict free discussions about matters of public 
concern.103  Assuming that the state has a compelling interest in ensuring that 
all circulators are residents, Justice Thomas notes that a large part of Colorado 
residents are not registered voters, and the state could more precisely achieve 
its interest of enforcing its election laws with a residency requirement.104 
 
 95. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 643 (citing Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358). 
 96. Id. at 639-40. 
 97. Id. at 643 (citing Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422). 
 98. Id. (citing Meyer, 486 U.S. at 423). 
 99. Id. at 644. 
 100. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 651 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 101. Id.  A lead plaintiff and long-time active in ballot-initiative support testified that his 
refusal to register is a “form of  . . . private and public protest.” (testimony of William Orr, 
Executive Director of the ACLF).  Id. (citing 1 Tr. 223). 
 102. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 651 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 103. Id.  In fact the briefs indicate that circulators do not discuss the merits of a proposed 
change by initiate in any great depth.  National Voter Outreach, Inc., an Amicus curiae in support 
of respondents and the largest organizer of paid petition circulation drives in the United States, 
describes most conversations between the circulator and the prospective petition signer as “brief.”  
Brief for National Voter Outreach, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 21, Buckley v. ACLF (No. 97-930). 
 104. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 652 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Colorado’s law requires 
that petition circulators be registered electors, and while one must reside in Colorado in order to 
be a registered voter.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-2-101(1)(b), Colorado does not have a separate 
residency requirement.  Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 652 n.4. 
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The dissent, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, points out that Meyer did 
not decide that a state is prohibited from imposing reasonable regulations on 
circulation.105  Before this decision, a state could have imposed reasonable 
regulations on the circulation of initiative petitions, so that some order could be 
established over the inherently chaotic nature of democratic processes.106  
Rehnquist notes that this decision calls into question the validity of any 
regulation of petition circulation that would fall under the majority’s highly 
abstract and mechanical test of invalidating a restriction that diminishes the 
pool of petition circulators, or makes a proposal less likely to appear on the 
ballot.107 
Justice O’Connor also dissents from the majority because she believes the 
registered voter requirement is a permissible regulation of the electoral 
process.108  She notes that the Court has upheld analogous restrictions on 
qualifications to vote in a primary election, and on candidate eligibility as 
reasonable regulations of the electoral process.109  Because the requirement is 
neutral qualification for participation in the petition process, it only indirectly 
and incidentally burdens the communicative aspects of petition circulation thus 
subjecting it to a reasonable test.110  Agreeing with the Chief Justice that this 
requirement can easily be satisfied, and that it differs from the prohibition on 
paid circulators invalidated in Meyer, she notes the registration requirement 
does not ban an existing class of circulators, or silence those who are “able and 
willing” to circulate ballot initiative petitions.111  Additionally, the existence 
and severity of the burden on one-on-one communication is not as clearly 
established in the record as the majority suggests.112  O’Connor applies her 
lesser strict scrutiny to require the state to advance a legitimate interest to be a 
reasonable regulation of the electoral process, as applied in Burdick.113  She 
 
 105. Id. at 659. 
 106. See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358. 
 107. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 660. 
 108. Id. at 654 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 109. Id. at 655.  See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756-62 (1973) (upholding 
qualifications to vote in primary); Storer, 415 U.S. at 728-37 (upholding candidate eligibility 
requirement). 
 110. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 655. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.  Witness Jon Baraga testified that some potential circulators are not registered to vote 
because they feel the political process is not responsive to their needs, but went on to testify that 
many of the same people would register to vote if an initiative they supported were placed on the 
ballot.  ACLF v. Meyer, 870 F.Supp. at 1001. 
 113. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428.  In upholding Hawaii’s prohibition of write-in voting, the 
Court noted that although the voter’s rights are fundamentally significant under the constitutional 
structure, it did not follow that “the right to vote in any manner and the right to associate for 
political purposes through the ballot are absolute.”  Id. at 433 (citing Illinois Bd. of Elections v. 
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979). 
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accepts Colorado’s arguments that it is necessary to enforce its laws 
prohibiting circulation fraud and to guarantee the states ability to exercise its 
subpoena power over those who violate these laws, as two patently legitimate 
interests.114  O’Connor would uphold the requirement as a reasonable 
regulation of Colorado’s electoral process. 
E. Identification Badge Restriction115 
The Colorado statute requiring circulators for initiative and referendum 
petitions to wear personal identification badges was found to have 
unconstitutionally infringed on the circulators’ First Amendment rights.116 The 
state interest in requiring name badges enables the public to identify, as well as 
the state to be able to apprehend petition circulators who engage in 
misconduct.117 
The majority found that the badge requirement is invalid as it requires 
circulators to display their names.118  Justice Ginsburg states that the notarized 
submission available to law enforcement renders the Colorado’s provision for 
personal names in identification badges less necessary.119  The badges reveal 
personal information about the circulators when “reaction to the circulator’s 
message is immediate, and may be the most intense, emotional, and 
unreasoned,” whereas the affidavit does not expose the circulator to the risk of 
 
 114. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 656.  See also, Timmons, 520 U.S. at 366-67. 
 115. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-112(2)(1998).  The statute provides: 
(a) “All circulators who are not to be paid for circulating petitions 
concerning ballot issues shall display an identification badge that 
includes the words “VOLUNTEER CIRCULATOR” in bold-faced type 
which is clearly legible and the circulator’s name.” 
(b) “All circulators who are to be paid for circulating petitions concerning 
ballot issues shall display an identification badge that includes the words 
“PAID CIRCULATOR” in bold-faced type which is clearly legible, the 
circulator’s name, and the name and telephone number of the individual 
employing the circulator.” 
Id.  Colorado enacted the provision five years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Meyer. 
Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 645.  A similar requirement that badges disclose whether the 
circulator is paid or a volunteer, and if paid by whom, was not challenged by the ACLF.  Id.  
Colorado does not require identification badges for persons who gather signatures to place 
candidates on the ballot.  Id. n.18.  See generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-905 (1998) (regulations 
governing candidate-petition circulators).  An unchallenged provision provides that each petition 
must contain along with the collected signatures of voters, the circulator’s name, address, and 
signature.  Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 645. 
 116. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 645. 
 117. Brief for Petitioner at 36-37; see also, Reply Brief at 17. 
 118. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 646. 
 119. Id. at 645. 
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the “heat of the moment” harassment.120  The name identification inhibits 
participation in the petitioning process.121  The two individuals who testified 
believed that it discourages participation because of the controversial views 
that such initiatives may include such as legalizing marijuana.122  Petition 
circulators must endeavor to persuade electors to sign the petition.  The 
necessity for the freedom to anonymously speak one’s views is heightened for 
the petition circulator because the badge requirement compels personal name 
identification at the precise moment when the circulator’s anonymity is 
greatest.123 
The Court applied the decision of McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n.124  
McIntyre applied “exacting scrutiny” to Ohio’s fraud prevention justifications 
in holding that the ban on anonymous speech violated the First Amendment.125  
The complaint in McIntyre challenged an Ohio law that prohibited the 
distribution of anonymous campaigning literature.126  Because “circulating a 
petition is akin to distributing a handbill in invoking one-on-one 
communication, the Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s invalidation under the 
First Amendment.127  The name badge requirement does not qualify under the 
“more limited [election process] identification requirement alluded to in 
McIntyre.128  The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals invalidation of the 
badge requirement because it discourages participation in the petition 
circulation process by forcing name identification without sufficient cause.129 
The other justices unanimously agree that the identification badge 
requirement is invalid because it directly regulates the content of speech.  
Justice Thomas would apply a stricter standard than the majority applied.130  
The requirement is not narrowly tailored, and the state failed to satisfy its 
 
 120. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 645 (citing ACLF v. Meyer, 870 F.Supp. at 1004 
(observing that affidavits are not instantly accessible, and are therefore less likely to be used “for 
such purposes as retaliation or harassment”).  See also, Brief for Respondent, at 47. 
 121. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 645. 
 122. Id.  A witness told of the harassment that he personally experienced as a circulator of a 
hemp initiative petition.  See ACLF v. Meyer, 870 F.Supp. at 1001.  He also testified to the 
reluctance of potential circulators to face the recrimination and retaliation that bearers of petitions 
on “volatile” issues sometimes encounter (stating that “with their name on a badge, it makes them 
afraid” (testimony of Jon Baraga)).  Id. at 1001-1002. 
 123. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 646. 
 124. 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
 125. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 645-46. 
 126. Id. at 645. 
 127. Id. at 646. 
 128. Id. (citing to McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 353) (“We recognize that a State’s enforcement 
interest might justify a more limited identification requirement, but Ohio has shown scant cause 
for inhibiting the leafleting at issue here.”); see also id. at 358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 129. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 646. 
 130. Id. at 651 (Thomas, J., concurring).  See also, Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). 
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burden of demonstrating that fraud is a real problem.131  Justice O’Connor, 
along with Chief Justice Rehnquist, agrees with the majority that the First 
Amendment renders the identification badge requirement unconstitutional.132  
O’Connor notes that the badge imports into the one-on-one dialogue of petition 
circulation, a message the circulator might otherwise refrain from delivering, 
and that it deters some initiative petition circulators from disseminating their 
ideas.133 
F. Financial Disclosure Provision134 
Colorado’s disclosure provisions were enacted in response to the Court’s 
invalidation of the prohibition of paid circulators in Meyer.135  The statute 
requires proponents of petitions, who pay circulators, to file both monthly 
reports during the circulation period in addition to a final report when the 
initiative petition is submitted to the Secretary of the State.136  Colorado’s 
reasons to enact such restrictions were that public disclosure of the political 
contributions and expenditures inform voters in making intelligent choices in 
the election process, and help to combat fraud.137  The disclosure deters 
circulation fraud and abuse by encouraging petition circulators to be truthful 
 
 131. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 651.  See also Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 
512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994); Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm’n v. Federal Election 
Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 647 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). 
 132. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 654, 662 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part 
and dissenting in part) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 133. Id. at 654. 
 134. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-121(1998).  The statute provides in relevant part: 
(1) “The proponents of the petition shall file . . . the name, address, and county of 
voter registration of all circulators who were paid to circulate any section of the 
petition, the amount paid per signature, and the total amount to each circulator.  
The filing shall be made at the same time the petition is filed with the secretary of 
state . . .” 
(2) “The proponents of the petition shall sign and file monthly reports with the 
secretary of state, due ten days after the last day of each month in which petitions 
are circulators.  Monthly reports shall set forth the following: 
(a) The names of the proponents; 
(b) The name and the residential and business addresses of each of the paid 
circulators; 
(c) The name of the proposed ballot measure for which petitions are being 
circulated by paid circulators; and 
(d) The amount of money paid and owed to each paid circulator for petition 
circulation during the month in question.” 
 135. See 1993 Colo. Sess. Laws, Ch.183, § 1. 
 136. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-121 (1998). Colorado does not require similar disclosure 
provisions for persons who gather signatures to place candidates on the ballot.  See generally 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-905 (1998) (regulations governing candidate-petition circulators). 
 137. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 61-7. 
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and self-disciplined.138  These are among the interests the Court found to be 
substantial in Buckley v. Valeo.139  Colorado has a legitimate interest in law 
enforcement to detect and identify in a timely basis, abusive or fraudulent 
circulators. 140  Moreover it provides facts useful to voters who are weighing 
their options by evaluating the sincerity, or the potential bias of any circulator 
that approaches them.141 
The majority opinion looks to Buckley v. Valeo142 for the standard of 
review to apply to the restriction of disclosing paid circulation.143  Justice 
Ginsburg applies “exacting scrutiny” when compelled disclosure of campaign-
related payments is at issue.144  The Tenth Circuit did not invalidate the 
Colorado statute “as a whole.”145  There is a substantial state interest in 
disclosing names of initiative sponsors, and of the amounts they have spent 
gathering support for their initiatives.146  The Tenth Circuit invalidated the 
provision demanding “detailed monthly disclosures.147  The Court rejected 
compelled disclosure of the name and address of each paid circulator, and the 
amount of money paid and owed to each circulator during the month.148  As the 
Court of Appeals did not identify any infirmities in the required reporting, the 
majority expressed no opinion whether those monthly report prescriptions 
would survive review standing alone.149  Nevertheless, monthly disclosures are 
no longer required.  As for the final report provision, the Tenth Circuit 
invalidated only the portion that compels disclosure of information specific to 
each paid circulator.150  As modified the final report will reveal the amount 
paid per petition signature, and thus the total amount paid to the circulators.151 
 
 138. Id. at 67 
 139. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 656 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part).  See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 67, 68 (per curium) (holding that the 
Government has a substantial interest in requiring candidates to disclose the sources of campaign 
contributions to provide the electorate with information about “the interests to which a candidate 
is most likely to be responsive” to “deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of 
corruption,” and “to detect violations of the contribution limitations”). 
 140. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 647. 
 141. Id. 
 142. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 143. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 647. 
 144. Id.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 64-65. 
 145. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 646. 
 146. Id. at 647. 
 147. Id. (citing Meyer v. ACLF, 120 F.3d at 1105). 
 148. Id.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-120(2)(b),(d) (1998). 
 149. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 647. 
 150. Id. at 646-47.  In particular, the Court invalidated the disclosure of the circulator’s names 
and addresses and the total amount paid to each circulator.  See ACLF v. Meyer, 120 F.3d at 
1104-05. 
 151. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 647. 
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The Court notes that disclosure of the names of initiative sponsors, and the 
amounts spent gathering support for their initiative responds to the substantial 
state interests.152  However, Justice Ginsburg notes that ballot initiatives differ 
from the disclosure provisions of the money paid to or for the candidates in 
Buckley v. Valeo because the former does not involve the risk of “quid pro 
quo” corruption.153  As stated in Meyer, “the risk of fraud or corruption, or the 
appearance thereof, is more remote at the petition stage of an initiative than at 
the time of balloting.”154  Absent evidence to the contrary, the Court is not 
prepared to assume that a professional circulator is more likely to accept false 
signatures than a volunteer.155  The Court believes that Colorado can meet their 
substantial interests in regulating the ballot-initiative process with the less 
restrictive measures validated by the Court of Appeals.156  The statute as it 
stands leaves in tact the proper ballot access controls that do not unjustifiably 
inhibit the circulation of ballot initiative petitions.157 
Justice Thomas views the burdens that the reporting requirements impose 
do not constitute a “severe burden” on core political speech.158  However, any 
type of disclosure can seriously infringe on the privacy of association and 
belief granted by the First Amendment and must pass a “strict test.”159  
Recognizing that the state requires the identification of only paid circulators, 
and the risk of improper conduct is more remote at the petition stage of an 
initiative, the law does not serve the state interest of providing a complete 
picture of how money is being spent to get a measure on the ballot.160The 
provision as rewritten by the lower courts would pass the rigors of strict 
scrutiny.161  Assuming the state’s interests in having the information available 
to the press and voters before the initiative is voted is compelling, Justice 
Thomas finds that the reporting provision as modified by the lower courts 
 
 152. Id. (citing ACLF v. Meyer, 870 F.Supp. at 1003). 
 153. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 427-28 (1998) (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790 (“The 
risk of corruption perceived in cases involving risk of corruption perceived in cases involving 
candidate elections . . . simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue.”)); McIntyre, 514 
U.S. at 352 n.15. 
 154. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 648 (citing Meyer, 486 U.S. at 427). 
 155. Justice Ginsburg’s assumption is based on professional circulators may depend on a 
reputation for competence and integrity for future assignments, whereas a volunteer is motivated 
entirely by an interest in having the proposition placed on the ballot.  See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 426. 
 156. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 648. 
 157. Id. at 649. 
 158. Id. at 651 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 159. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 64, 66). 
 160. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 652. 
 161. The statute as it stands after this decision provides proponents must disclose the amount 
paid per petition signature and the total amount paid to each circulator, without identifying each 
circulator at the time the petition is filed.  Id. at 653. 
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ensures the public will receive information regarding the financial support 
behind the initiative proposal before they can vote.162 
Chief Justice Rehnquist disagrees that the First Amendment renders the 
disclosure requirements unconstitutional.163  Rehnquist believes the majority’s 
reasoning is illogical because in the portion that the Court left untouched, all 
circulators, whether paid or volunteer, must surrender their anonymity in the 
affidavit that was upheld by the Tenth Circuit as not significantly burdening 
political expression.164  This is in contrast to the majority’s reliance that there 
is no risk of “quid pro quo” corruption when money is paid to ballot initiatives 
circulators, and that paid circulators should not have to surrender their 
anonymity enjoyed by their volunteer counterparts.165  The only additional 
piece of information that the disclosure requirement asks is the amount paid to 
each circulator.166  Through the affidavit, the identity of the circulators as well 
as the total amount of money paid will be a matter of public record.167  This 
additional requirement is not sufficient to invalidate the disclosure 
requirements that serve substantial interests and are narrowly tailored to satisfy 
the First Amendment.168 
Justice O’Connor finds the majority’s holding that the disclosure 
provisions are partially unconstitutional to be most disturbing.169  She agrees 
with Rehnquist that the disclosure reports are virtually indistinguishable from 
the affidavit, which the Court suggests is a permissible regulation of the 
electoral process.170  Furthermore, the disclosure reports are a lesser burden 
than the affidavits because the latter are completed by the petition circulator, 
while the former are completed by the initiative proponent and are thus a step 
removed from petition circulation.171  Additionally, the affidavit is not an 
effective substitute because the affidavits are not completed until after all 
signatures have been collected, and thus after the time that the information is 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 662. 
 164. Id. (citing ACLF v. Meyer, 120 F.3d at 1099).  Colorado law requires that each circulator 
must submit as affidavit that must include the circulator’s name, the address at which he or she 
resides, including the street name and number, the city or town, and the country.  COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 1-40-111(2) (1998).  The majority relies on the constitutionality of the affidavit in 
invalidating the registered voter requirement.  Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 644. 
 165. Id. at 662. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 656 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgement in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 170. Id.  See also id. at 645-46. 
 171. Id. at 657. 
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needed.172  The public would have more access to the monthly disclosure 
reports, and as the District Court found, the public will have “greater difficulty 
in finding [the] names and addresses [of petition circulators] in the masses of 
papers filed with the petitions as compared with the monthly reports.”173  
Under the flexible strict scrutiny, a regulation of the electoral process with an 
indirect and insignificant effect on speech such as the disclosure provision 
should be upheld so long as it advances a legitimate government interest.174  
However, Justice O’Connor would still uphold the disclosure provision even 
under the more exacting scrutiny applied by the majority and Justice 
Thomas.175 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The restrictions imposed by Colorado were found to significantly inhibit 
communication with voters about proposed political change, and were not 
justified by Colorado’s interest in administrative efficiency, fraud detection, or 
voter education.176  Although the exact level of scrutiny applied by the Court is 
debatable, it can be determined that some type of flexible standard will be 
applied to election regulations as applied by all of the Justices in Burdick.  The 
First Amendment hurdle for the state is a difficult one to jump over, but it is 
clearable.  Although the Court has on occasion invalidated state laws that 
severely burden political speech,177 it has repeatedly upheld reasonable state 
regulation of the electoral process.178  In examining how the Court balanced 
the state’s interest to enact the voter registration requirement, the identification 
badge requirement, and the financial disclosure provisions, states may look to 
Buckley v. ACLF to develop an efficient and reasonable direct democracy 
system, to create a regulatory system that will not overburden the petitioners’ 
First Amendment rights while achieving the desired protections. 
 
 172. Id. at 658.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-111(2) (1998) (“Any signature added to a 
section of a petition after the affidavit has been executed shall be invalid.”). 
 173. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 658 (citing ACLF v. Meyer, 870 F.Supp. at 1004). 
 174. Id. at 656. 
 175. Id. at 658. 
 176. See id. at 638. 
 177. See, e.g., McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 334 (invalidating Ohio’s statutory prohibition against 
distribution of any anonymous campaign literature as violative of the First Amendment); 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 780 (invalidating Ohio’s statute requiring early filing deadline for 
independent candidates as placing an unconstitutional burden on voting and associational rights 
of supporters of independent candidates); Meyer, 486 U.S. at 414 (invalidating Colorado’s 
prohibition against paying circulators as violative of the First Amendment). 
 178. See, e.g., Timmons, 520 U.S. at 351 (upholding Minnesota’s antifusion laws prohibiting 
candidates from appearing on the ballot as candidate of more than one political party); Burdick, 
504 U.S. at 428 (upholding Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] BUCKLEY V. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOUNDATION 199 
A. What is the Proper Level of Scrutiny? 
Although the Court applied strict scrutiny, it should have given more 
credence to the state to provide “a substantial regulation of elections if they are 
to be fair and honest, and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to 
accompany the democratic processes.”179  The majority opinion was silent as 
to the exact level of scrutiny, departing from past decisions such as Meyer, 
McIntyre, and Burdick.  Ginsburg’s majority opinion reasoning however more 
closely follows the opinion by Justice O’Connor, as opposed to Justice 
Thomas.  Although Justice O’Connor is more willing to find regulations to 
indirectly impact political speech than the Court, the majority examines each 
restriction to determine if it has a direct or indirect impact.  This reasoning is in 
stark contrast to that of Justice Thomas, who would find almost any restriction 
on the election process to have an impact on political speech and to render it 
unconstitutional.  No other Justice in this case shares his view that restrictions 
that indirectly impact the election process are invalid.  It is safe to say that the 
Court will apply a flexible standard, but whether the restriction will fall under 
the lesser or the stricter standard is still uncertain. 
The Court, in justifying the invalidation of the regulations in question, 
emphasized other restrictions in place that adequately achieve Colorado’s 
purpose.  The Court did not provide its reasons as to why those restrictions not 
reviewed were any less burdensome than those that were.  In fact, as pointed 
out by Justice O’Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist, the affidavit that was 
assumed to be a legitimate restriction in order to justify invalidating the voter-
registration requirement, demands almost the same information to be disclosed 
as required by the financial disclosure statute that was struck down.  The logic 
Justice Ginsburg used to invalidate certain restrictions, noting other restrictions 
already exist, gives little guidance to a state legislature desiring to meet the 
need to regulate the direct democracy system.180  Determining the exact level 
 
 179. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 636 (citing Storer, 415 U.S. at 730; Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 
at 788; Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358). 
 180. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 648.  See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 426-27; Meyer v. ACLF, 
120 F.3d, at 1103, 1105; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-130(1)(b) (1998) (making it criminal 
to forge initiative-petition signatures); § 1-40-132(1) (initiative-petition section deemed void if 
circulator has violated any provision of the laws governing circulation). 
  To ensure grass roots support, Colorado conditions placement of an initiative proposal 
on the ballot on the proponent’s submission of valid signatures representing five percent of the 
total votes cast for all candidates for Secretary of State at the previous general election.  COLO. 
CONST. art. V, §1(2); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-109(1) (1998); see also Meyer, 486 U.S. at 425-
26; Meyer v. ACLF, 120 F.3d at 1105. 
  Furthermore, in aid of efficiency, veracity, or clarity, Colorado has provided for an array 
of process measures not contested here by ACLF.  These measures prescribe, inter alia, a single 
subject per initiative limitation, COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-106.5(1)(a) (1998); a signature 
verification method, § 1-40-116; a large plain-English notice alerting potential signers of petitions 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
200 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:177 
of scrutiny applied by the Court can be difficult because of the departure from 
its earlier decisions of explicitly stating what the proper scrutiny is to apply.  
The Court will apply strict scrutiny to any regulation that directly impacts core 
political speech, but any lesser regulation will be closely scrutinized to 
determine it’s impact on the initiative process. 
B. Registration Requirements 
Colorado attempted to follow the Court’s direction in Meyer, in drafting 
legislation that allowed registered voters to circulate initiative-petitions while 
upholding the goal of protecting the decency of the process.  Colorado 
experienced a surge in the use of paid petition circulators and in the number of 
abuses reported.181  The Court, by noting the substantial need for regulation, 
should have given more credit to Colorado’s compelling interests and the 
minimal burden it places on circulators.  The Colorado statute does not place 
any restrictions on the ability to register to vote, nor does it prohibit any person 
from registering who wants to circulate petitions.  In fact, the state has made 
the process of registering readily available to anyone who qualifies.182  
Colorado law establishes their requirements for voter registration, that a person 
be 18 years of age, a U.S. citizen, and a resident of the state for at least 30 
days.183  Registering to vote in Colorado is an exceedingly easy procedure that 
can be done at the county clerk’s office, by postcard, or at a driver’s license 
examination facility.184 
For those who feel the democratic system is not responsive to their 
political needs, they have the opportunity to have a direct impact by using the 
initiative process.  Those who choose not to vote for political reasons can still 
express their political views, and register to become circulators.  There is no 
requirement to vote once a citizen has registered.  It is those that refuse to 
register whom prevent themselves from being able to decide the issue they 
want (or for which they are paid) to promote.  There is evidence that a few 
people specifically do not register out of protest for their political beliefs.  
These people have the right under the First Amendment to not be forced into 
participating in the system they differ from ideologically.  However, there is no 
prohibition on unregistered citizens from organizing the initiative, and having 
volunteers or paid circulators gather signatures.  Without the restriction, 
special interest groups are left to overtake the initiative process from the 
citizen.  While it might make it more burdensome for a few individuals, the 
 
to the law’s requirements, § 1-40-110(1); and the text of the affidavit to which all circulators must 
subscribe, § 1-40-111(2). 
 181. Amicus Brief at 12, available in Westlaw, 1998 WL 212593. 
 182. See id. at 22. 
 183. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-2-101. 
 184. See id. §§ 1-2-202, 208, and 213. 
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preservation of the system to ensure access to the grass roots proponents as 
well as the heavily financed special interest groups should give substantial 
weight to allow certain restrictions.  The same forces that caused the need for 
direct democracy are quickly eradicating its objectives, the ability of the 
citizen to directly initiate law that the legislature has failed to provide because 
of the influence of special interest groups.  Ironically, those groups are finding 
it just as easy to influence ballot propositions with large money expenditures as 
it is to use money to influence the legislatures.  As the price tag for putting an 
initiative on the ballot is driven up through the large pocketbooks of the special 
interest groups, grassroots efforts with little financial backing effectively 
become shut out of the system that was originally designed to support those 
efforts.  Granted, protections exist that the courts have not invalidated, 
however the fact remains that the average citizen who does not have the 
$900,000 to combat the spending power of any opposing special interest 
groups will not have a chance to be heard. 
C. Disclosure Provisions 
As explained in Buckley v. Valeo, disclosure provides the electorate with 
information “as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is 
spent to aid electors in evaluating those who seek their vote.”185  Additional 
disclosure deters actual corruption and avoids the appearance of corruption in 
exposing large contributions and expenditures.186  The Court has not provided 
any justification for the invalidation other than the purpose is served by already 
served by the affidavit that was presumed valid.  As the affidavit and 
disclosure provisions are similar, it is uncertain how the Court would analyze 
the affidavit on its own validity.  Keeping in line with Buckley v. Valeo, the 
Court should support the state in its effort to shed light into an area typically 
abused by the big budgeted special interest groups.  By providing the voters 
with accurate information, they will be better equipped to make informed 
decisions.  The Tenth Circuit did keep some disclosure provisions in tact that 
allow Colorado to achieve part of its goal.  The holding however, provides 
more confusion as to the proper level of disclosure required. 
D. Implications on the State and the Citizen 
As noted by both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, 
Colorado’s registration requirement parallels the requirements in place in at 
least nineteen other states and the District of Colombia that explicitly require 
 
 185. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 647 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 66 (internal 
quotations marks omitted)). 
 186. Id. at 647 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 67); see also Grosjean v. American Press 
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (observing that an “informed public opinion is the most potent of 
all restraints in misgovernment). 
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candidate petition circulators be electors,187 and at least one other state requires 
that its petition circulators be state residents.188  These now are questionable in 
light of the Court’s decision in Buckley v. ACLF. 
According to the majority, a restriction that significantly inhibits 
communication with voters about proposed political change will be found 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.  A state should be confident in 
passing a regulation on the electoral process itself, and not one that inhibits 
either voters, or the circulators of petitions.  However, as each Justice noted, a 
residency requirement for circulators would be considered a reasonable 
regulation in light of the state’s compelling interest maintaining jurisdiction 
over the circulators, and preventing fraud.189  Six months after Buckley v. 
ACLF, the Southern District Court of Mississippi decided the case Kean v. 
Clark,190 which challenged the validity of an amendment to the Mississippi 
Constitution.191  The state imposed restrictions on the circulators of petitions 
for ballot initiatives.192  The court held that the residency requirement for 
circulators of petitions for ballot initiatives did not violate their First 
Amendment rights.193  This regulation differs from the Colorado regulation 
invalidated in Buckley v. ACLF, because it only requires the circulators to be 
residents, not registered voters.  This is the type of regulation the state should 
 
 187. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 661 n.3 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  The states that 
require candidate petition circulators to be electors are: ARIZ.REV.STAT. ANN. § 16-315 (1996) 
(Arizona); CAL.ELEC.CODE ANN. § 8106(b)(4) (West 1996) (California); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-
4-905 (1998) (Colorado); CONN. GEN.STAT. § 9-410 (Supp.1998) (Connecticut); D.C.CODE ANN. 
§ 1-1312(b)(2) (1992) (Washington D.C.); IDAHO CODE § § 34-626, 34-1807 (Supp.1998) 
(Idaho); ILL.COMP.STAT., ch. 10, § § 5/7-10, 5/8-8, 5/10-4 (Supp.1998) (Illinois); 
KAN.STAT.ANN. § 25-205(d) (1993) (Kansas); MICH.COMP.LAWS § 168.544c(3) (Supp.1998) 
(Michigan); MO.REV.STAT. § 115.325(2) (1997) (Missouri); NEB.REV.STAT. § 32-630 
(Supp.1997) (Nebraska); N.Y.ELEC.LAW § § 6-132, 6-140, 6-204, 6-206 (McKinney 1998) (New 
York); OHIO REV.CODE ANN. § 3503.06 (1996) (Ohio); 25 PA.CONS.STAT. § 2869 (1994) 
(Pennsylvania); R.I.GEN.LAWS § 17-23-12 (1996) (Rhode Island); S.D.COMP.LAWS § 12-1-3 
(1995) (South Dakota); VA.CODE ANN. § 24.2-521 (Supp.1998) (Virginia); W.VA.CODE § 3-5-23 
(1994) (West Virginia); WIS.STAT. § 8.40 (1996) (Wisconsin); Wyo.Stat. § 22-5-304 (1992) 
(Wyoming). 
 188. Id. n.4 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  See GA.CODE ANN. §§ 21-2-132(g)(3)(A), 21-
2170(d)(1) (1993 and Supp. 1997) (Georgia). 
 189. Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 644, 651-652.  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
O’Connor found the voter registration requirement in which voters must be residents, to be a 
reasonable regulation.  Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgement in part and dissenting in part). 
 190. 56 F.Supp.2d 719 (S.D. Miss. 1999).  The same court has previously invalidated 
Mississippi’s registered-voter requirement as unconstitutional.  See Term Limits Leadership 
Council, Inc. v. Clark, 984 F.Supp. 470 (S.D. Miss. 1997). 
 191. Mississippi adopted the indirect initiative for Constitutional Amendments in 1992.  
DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 9, at 28 tbl.1. 
 192. Keen, 56 F.Supp.2d at 721; see MISS. CONST. art. XV, § 273 (12) (1998). 
 193. Id. at 732. 
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implement in order to achieve the goals of administrative efficiency, fraud 
detection and prevention, and voter education while imposing the least possible 
burden on the petition circulators.  If this case would reach the Supreme Court, 
they will most likely uphold the residency requirement following the 
suggestions made by the Court in Buckley v. ACLF. 
An overwhelming 84 per cent of California citizens polled agreed that “an 
average voter cannot make an intelligent choice” with so many initiatives on 
the ballot posing complex questions.194  Because the initiative process bypasses 
the legislative process, safeguards are necessary to provide for an informed 
electorate.  The Court has prevented the state from this objective.  The 
Supreme Court in this decision has made it more difficult for a state to control 
its own direct democracy process, while providing special interest groups with 
more leeway for potential abuse.  While the restrictions placed minor obstacles 
to the petition process, it did not initiate any burden that would deny any new 
group the ability to register.  Colorado’s intention was to safeguard the process 
to ensure the voters knew why the issue is being proposed to make an 
informative decision.  Although the Court has struck down a variety of 
restrictions imposed by Colorado to regulate its initiative process, states can 
now develop a statute that will achieve the objectives of creating a fair and 
ordered system for its direct democracy process. 
A good example for the state to follow would be the Mississippi statute.195  
The Court has moved towards accepting restrictions placed by states on their 
own direct democracy process.  Moving from a unanimous decision in Meyer, 
the decision in Buckley v. ACLF suggests the Court is willing to give the States 
more power to control their own affairs.  By using a more flexible level of 
scrutiny, regulations that indirectly impose a burden on the electoral process 
will be upheld.  Through the 1999-2000 term, there are signs of Rehnquist 
gaining additional support for furthering state rights.196  A third time may 
prove to be the charm for the state desiring to protect the direct democracy 
system for their citizens, and restrict special interest groups from tarnishing an 
otherwise legitimate attempt to give control to the people of the state. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The objective of direct democracy was to grant power to the citizen at a 
time when the legislature was unresponsive to the public’s needs.  At a time 
when corruption and influence from special interest groups hampered the 
ability of the elected representatives to promote legislation beneficial to the 
 
 194. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 9, at 4 (citing “Voters Say Initiative Process is Too 
Complicated, Out of Control,” LOS ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 4, 1990, at A1, A38, A43). 
 195. See supra text accompanying note 192. 
 196. See David G. Savage, Chief Justice Rehnquist Seems Determined to Limit Federal 
Authority, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Oct. 1, 1999, at A8. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
204 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:177 
common citizen populist movements looked to direct democracy as a tool to 
combat such abuses.  Direct democracy possesses many benefits, but there are 
also many risks if the system goes unregulated.  While some restrictions do 
place burdens on the political speech of a few citizens desiring to cause change 
in their society at the same time as protesting that society, restrictions are a 
necessary evil to ensure the process is fair, efficient, and free from corruption.  
Colorado’s most recent attempt to provide such restrictions was invalidated by 
the Supreme Court in Buckley v. ACLF.  However, the decision did leave some 
restrictions in tact to meet some of the state’s objectives.  Furthermore, this 
case can serve as a guide to states that find it necessary to protect their direct 
democracy system for their citizens, without placing any undue burdens on the 
fundamental right to political speech. 
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